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1.  Introduction  
 
We explore how firms prioritize across competing real investments when dealing with a severe 
negative finance shock.  Our basic idea is that protecting some investments creates more value for the 
firm than protecting other investments, in large part because adjustment costs differ substantially across 
alternative real investments.  As a consequence, firms should disproportionately use their cash and liquid 
assets to stabilize some investments, while permitting potentially sharp reductions in others.  We test 
these ideas by focusing on the differential treatment of R&D and fixed investment during the recent 
financial crisis.  We focus on R&D and fixed investment because they are the primary investments for 
modern firms and they likely have markedly different adjustment costs.
1
 In particular, cutting R&D 
investment typically entails releasing highly skilled technology workers, and reversing these cuts in the 
future brings about classic costs of adjustment (e.g., future hiring and training costs).  In addition, firing 
R&D workers exacerbates appropriability problems when fired workers transmit proprietary knowledge 
to competitors.  Since neither of these potential costs has any obvious counterpart when it comes to cuts 
in the rate of fixed investment, we expect firms facing a sharp decline in access to finance to buffer R&D 
much more aggressively than fixed investment.  
We focus on firms with investment in both fixed capital and R&D in the crisis period.  Though 
our insights extend to any time constrained firms face a firm-specific loss of access to finance, the crisis 
period is well-suited for testing our ideas because there is arguably a large exogenous negative shock to 
the availability of all forms of finance (e.g., Bliss et al., 2013; Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010).  
During the crisis, our summary statistics show large declines in the flow of new finance, a very sharp drop 
in fixed investment and modest declines in R&D.  Furthermore, the initial decline in cash stocks is 
sufficient to offset a substantial portion of the loss of internal and external finance.  In addition, simple 
median-based tests suggest that firms responded to the negative finance shock by protecting R&D much 
more than fixed investment.  For example, at the height of the crisis, the median within-firm annual 
change in R&D investment is a decline of just 2%, while the corresponding change in fixed investment is 
-25%.  Moreover, among the firms forced to cut both R&D and fixed investment during the crisis, an 
                                                 
1
 While our ideas would readily extend to other investments the firm undertakes, these investments typically are 
either relatively unimportant (e.g., advertising expenses) or have very low or no adjustment costs (e.g., working 
capital). We therefore focus on the choice between R&D and fixed investment. 
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overwhelming majority (84%) cut fixed investment more than R&D (and typically the reductions in fixed 
investment are far larger).   
To formally explore the differential buffering of R&D and fixed investment, we include changes 
in cash holdings in standard dynamic investment regressions.  We are particularly interested in how firms 
spent stocks of cash holdings to buffer competing investments during the crisis.
2
  We employ a “systems” 
GMM estimator which addresses the potential endogeneity of all financial variables in the regression.  In 
the crisis period, changes in cash holdings share a very strong negative relation with R&D, particularly in 
the peak two years of the crisis.  While there is some limited evidence in our main sample that cash 
holdings are used to protect fixed investment at the start of the crisis, the association between changes in 
cash holdings and fixed investment is far weaker (and typically insignificant) compared to the point 
estimates in the R&D regressions.  Thus, for firms doing both R&D and fixed investment, our evidence 
suggests that firms spent much more cash protecting R&D compared to fixed investment.  An additional 
test is motivated by the Campello et al. (2010, p. 471) survey evidence that “the vast majority of 
financially constrained firms sold assets in order to fund operations in 2008.”  We find a strong negative 
relation between changes in the stock of fixed assets and R&D, indicating that some firms so aggressively 
favored R&D that they allowed the stock of fixed capital to fall to provide additional resources to buffer 
R&D.  Finally, when we expand the sample to include large numbers of firms doing little or no R&D, we 
then find a substantial negative relation between changes in cash holdings and fixed investment. It 
appears that firms prioritize during a crisis, and when R&D expenditures are not competing for liquidity, 
firms do in fact allocate some liquidity to protect fixed investment.
 
 
We perform a number of robustness and falsification tests.  First, we re-estimate our main 
regressions with alternative controls for investment demand and find that there are no important 
quantitative changes in our main findings. Second, the need to prioritize across competing real 
investments in the face of a severe decline in the availability of finance should be strongest among firms 
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 Firms may also use debt capacity, derivatives and credit lines to smooth investment.  However, Almeida et al. 
(2014) note that the literature on liquidity management points to cash holdings as the most important source of 
liquidity when it comes to downside protection.  For example, Acharya et al. (2007) show that financially 
constrained firms whose financing needs arise mainly in low cash flow periods should build cash holdings as 
opposed to relying on spare debt capacity.  In addition, in a survey of CFOs in 29 countries, Lins et al. (2010) 
conclude that cash holdings are used to buffer negative cash flow shocks while credit lines are used to undertake 
new investment opportunities in good times.    
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most dependent on external finance (e.g., small, young, low-payout, and bank-dependent firms).  We in 
fact find that the firms a priori most likely to be affected by the crisis display the strongest evidence of 
utilizing stocks of cash holdings and fixed assets to buffer R&D investment.  Finally, while most of our 
study focuses on annual data, we reach similar conclusions using quarterly data.  In particular, we use a 
difference-in-differences approach similar to Duchin et al. (2010) and find a significant increase in the 
use of cash for R&D buffering during the quarters covering the crisis period, further supporting our main 
conclusions.   
Overall, our findings indicate that firms confronted with a negative finance shock protect R&D to 
a much greater extent than fixed investment.  To our knowledge, the differential buffering of R&D and 
fixed investment has not been explored in prior studies, perhaps because until very recently the corporate 
finance literature has focused almost exclusively on fixed capital investment.  Since R&D is now as large 
(or larger) than fixed investment for a substantial fraction of firms, assessing how firms prioritize across 
alternative investments is important for understanding liquidity management decisions in modern firms 
and for evaluating the real effects of negative finance shocks.  In particular, by focusing on differences 
across R&D and fixed investment, our study provides novel insights on the way firms use their cash 
reserves, highlights the conditions under which precautionary cash holdings are especially valuable, and 
offers the first detailed exploration of the impact of the financial crisis on R&D in the U.S.    
Our findings are especially relevant for the rapidly growing literature on cash holdings and 
corporate flexibility (see Almeida et al., 2014 and Denis, 2011 for reviews of the literature).  A number of 
studies develop theoretical models where cash holdings are used to transfer liquidity over time when 
firms have valuable future projects that may be lost due to financing constraints.
3
  Almeida et al. (2004) 
show that constrained firms save more of their cash flow as cash than unconstrained firms and several 
other studies show that firms most likely to face frictions in capital markets accumulate more cash (e.g., 
Harford, 1999; Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999).  Furthermore, there is evidence that cash holdings are 
more valuable for constrained firms (e.g., Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; 
Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007).  But surprisingly few empirical studies explore how firms actually use 
their cash holdings to protect real investment opportunities. Two exceptions are Denis and Sibilkov 
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(2010), who find a strong link between cash holdings and fixed investment for constrained firms, 
particularly those with high hedging needs, and Brown and Petersen (2011), who show that constrained 
firms spend cash holdings to smooth R&D.  In addition, Duchin et al. (2010) find that firms with more 
cash reserves have smaller reductions in fixed investment during the early phase of the recent financial 
crisis.  None of these studies, however, explore how firms prioritize their cash holdings across competing 
investments when navigating a severe negative finance shock.    
The use of cash to buffer R&D that we document is an important illustration of firms transferring 
liquidity into the future to support investment.  Corporate liquidity and financial flexibility can support 
investment either by allowing firms to readily fund valuable new investment projects or by preventing the 
slashing of key ongoing projects during a period of financial distress, which is clearly the focus of our 
study.  The favorable treatment of R&D over fixed investment sheds light on the types of firms that are 
most (and least) likely to gain from financial flexibility.  In particular, there is an important literature on 
the agency costs of cash holdings (see Duchin et al., 2010 for a review) and our findings point to the types 
of firms where the benefits from precautionary cash holdings likely outweigh agency costs.  It is also 
worth pointing out that our findings suggest that studies exploring the precautionary role of cash and 
focusing only on fixed investment may reach incorrect conclusions about the importance of stocks of 
liquidity for supporting investment and preserving firm flexibility. Finally, our results help explain the 
finding that R&D intensity, but not fixed investment, is strongly positively correlated with the level of 
cash holdings across firms (Bates et al., 2009) and why cash is more valuable in R&D-intensive firms and 
industries (Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). 
Since there has been almost no assessment of the impact of the recent financial crisis on R&D, 
our study also contributes to the literature on the economic effects of the crisis.  During the recent crisis, 
aggregate industrial R&D did not decline in 2008 and fell by only 2.9% in 2009, less than one-sixth the 
percentage decline in business fixed investment.
4
 Our micro-level findings go a long way in explaining 
why aggregate business R&D did not fall more sharply in the face of enormous declines in aggregate 
internal finance and stock issues.  In addition, given the importance of R&D for long-run economic 
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 Nominal R&D figures are from the NSF (12-310).  The level of private nonresidential fixed investment fell 17.8% 
in 2009 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis).  The monthly producer price index for capital equipment (from the 
BLS) rose throughout 2008 and was basically unchanged throughout 2009.  Thus, the decline in fixed investment in 
2009 can be attributed to a decline in the physical quantity of investment, not the price of investment. 
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growth, our findings suggest that liquidity management policies by firms likely kept the long-run costs of 
the financial crisis from being even more severe.
5
 A key implication is that precautionary cash reserves 
not only have important private benefits for R&D-intensive firms, but also external benefits that accrue to 
the broad economy.   
A number of other studies explore financing and investment decisions during the crisis.  
Campello et al. (2010) survey CFOs in the U.S. (and abroad) and show that a very large fraction of U.S. 
firms faced binding financing constraints in late 2008.  Furthermore, CFOs of firms engaged in a 
multifaceted approach for dealing with the unfolding crisis: in particular, constrained firms in 2008 
burned through a substantial fraction of their cash holdings and engaged in asset sales to raise funds.  
Campello et al. (2012) report similar evidence from a survey of CFOs in Europe.  Our evidence supports 
these findings and in addition shows that firms were particularly interested in managing their resources to 
protect R&D.  Focusing on the initial phase of the financial crisis (July 2007 to June 2008), Duchin et al. 
(2010) find that fixed investment falls less for firms holding more cash reserves at the start of the crisis.  
Our study differs from Duchin et al. (2010) in several ways, most notably our examination of how cash 
reserves are differentially allocated across competing investments.  Kahle and Stulz (2013) argue that 
their evidence on similarities in investment by bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent firms cast doubts 
as to whether a credit supply shock played a central role in the recent crisis. We note that for our sample 
firms, credit finance is unimportant compared to the sharp declines in internal and external equity finance, 
so credit shocks per se are not the most important finance shock affecting our firms.  Furthermore, our 
findings suggest that firms worked aggressively to protect some types of investment, which they would 
not do if hit predominantly by a demand shock rather than a finance shock. Finally, Bliss et al. (2013) 
document substantial cuts in corporate payouts during the crisis, particularly for firms most likely to be 
susceptible to declines in credit availability, consistent with a negative shock to the availability of finance 
during the crisis. 
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 The key reason is that R&D is thought to have important spillovers, which is not the case of fixed investment.  See 
the endogenous growth literature beginning with Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). 
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2.  Motivation and Empirical Predictions 
2.1.  Adjustment Costs for R&D and Physical Investment 
R&D investment consists primarily of wage payments to scientists and engineers and there are 
multiple types of adjustment costs associated with firing/rehiring these workers. One obvious cost is 
hiring and training expenses which can be very large for highly skilled workers (see the review in 
Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996).  Second, as Hall and Lerner (2010) point out, when the “knowledge 
created by R&D workers is “tacit” rather than codified, it is embedded in the human capital of the firm’s 
employees, and is therefore lost if they leave or are fired.”  A final type of adjustment cost, broadly 
defined, is the loss in firm value arising from fired technology workers transmitting critical proprietary 
information to competitors. 
Of key importance to our arguments and predictions, there are several reasons to believe that 
adjustment costs rise much faster for R&D than for physical investment. First, the few studies that 
estimate adjustment costs for both R&D and physical investment typically report that R&D adjustment 
costs are substantially greater (e.g., Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989). Second, recent studies focusing 
specifically on physical investment report relatively low adjustment cost estimates (e.g., Cooper and 
Haltiwanger, 2006).  Finally, most physical investment is spending on new equipment.  Intuitively, this 
type of investment need not create high adjustment costs as sharp reductions in equipment investment 
likely do not involve firing skilled workers.     
2.2.  Formal Intuition   
Standard Euler conditions for investment provide insights for how firms should manage liquidity 
to buffer competing investments in a financial crisis (see the Appendix for a more detailed discussion).  
Denote investment in fixed capital by I, the stock of fixed capital by K, investment in technology by RD, 




.  The Euler conditions 
for fixed investment and R&D are    
          P
I
t   + (∂/∂I)t  =  βt Et [ θt{(∂П/∂K)t+1  +  P
I
t+1 + (∂/∂I) t+1 }]                                         (1) 
          P
RD
t + (∂/∂RD)t   =  βt Et [ θt{(∂П/∂T)t+1  +  P
RD
t+1 + (∂/∂RD) t+1}] .                  (2)  
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Equation (1) is equivalent to the Euler equation for fixed investment in Gilchrist and Himmelberg 
(1998) and Love (2003), while Equation (2) is the counterpart equation for R&D and is similar to the 
first-order condition in Hall (1995) and Hall and Lerner (2010).  In the Euler conditions, ∂/∂I and 
∂/∂RD are the marginal adjustment costs associated with fixed investment and R&D and ∂П/∂K and 
∂П/∂T are the marginal “profit” of capital and technology, respectively.  θt captures the relative value of 
finance across periods: θt = (1+λt+1)/(1+λt ), where λt  and λt+1 are the shadow values of finance in period t 
and t+1.  The left-hand side of each equation is the marginal cost of investing today; the right-hand side is 
the discounted marginal cost of postponing investment one period (i.e., the forgone marginal profits, the 
price of investment, and marginal adjustment costs).   
Suppose the firm is confronted with a one-period financial crisis that hits in period t and is 
expected to be over by the beginning of t+1.  The crisis drives λt  above expected λt+1 and thus drives down 
θt on the right-hand side of the Euler conditions.  To rebalance the conditions, firms clearly need to shift 
some investment (both fixed investment and R&D) from period t to period t+1, as such a shift drives 
down the marginal cost of adjustment in period t and drives up the marginal cost of adjustment in t+1.  
Other things equal, if marginal adjustment costs change much more slowly for fixed investment compared 
to R&D, firms need to make much larger (proportionate) cuts to fixed investment in order to rebalance the 
Euler conditions. This implies that optimizing firms will disproportionately allocate scarce stocks of 
liquidity to buffer R&D.   
2.3.  Estimating Equation 
Following Hall and Lerner (2010), we move from the Euler conditions to an estimating equation 
by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function and quadratic adjustment costs.
6
  The baseline 
empirical Euler specification is: 
tjjttjtjtjtj dSalesINVINVINV ,1,3
2
1,21,1,    ,                                  (3) 
where INVj,t is investment (either fixed investment or R&D) for firm j at time t.  Lagged investment and 
investment squared appear on the right-hand side of the regression; the quadratic term (INV
2
) appears 
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 Starting with similar Euler conditions, similar baseline specifications appear in Bond and Meghir (1994), Bond et 
al. (2003), and Love (2003).  See Bond and Meghir (1994) and Hall and Lerner (2010) for a discussion of the details 
on moving from the Euler condition to an estimating equation like we use. 
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because of quadratic adjustment costs and the expected coefficient is negative.  The baseline specification 
also includes lagged firm sales, a firm-specific effect (αj) and a time-specific effect (dt).  The firm effect 
controls for all unobserved time-invariant determinants of INV at the firm level (e.g., technology of the 
firm and industry characteristics) and the year effect controls for aggregate changes that could affect the 
demand for INV.    
Similar to Bond and Meghir (1994), Bond et al. (2003), and Brown et al. (2009), we augment the 
baseline specification with financial variables that capture access to finance.  The resulting dynamic 
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               (4) 
In equation (4) we add contemporaneous and lagged values of cash flow (CashFlow) and funds from 
stock issues (StkIssues) to measure firm’s access to both internal and external finance.  We also include 
changes in cash holdings (ΔCashHoldings), which captures the use of cash holdings as a source of 
liquidity for buffering investment.  Finally, we add current sales as an additional control for investment 
demand.  In Section 4 we consider alternative specifications with different demand controls and other 
sources of liquidity for buffering investment. All regression variables are scaled by the beginning-of-
period stock of firm assets.       
2.4.  Empirical Predictions 
If firms are effective at smoothing R&D we expect β1 to be close to one when INV in equation (4) 
is measured by R&D (which in fact is the case in all of our R&D regressions).  In contrast, when INV is 
measured by fixed investment, if firms make little effort to buffer fixed investment during a crisis, we 
expect β1 to be well below one (which is the case for nearly all of our fixed investment regressions).  Our 
main prediction concerns the pattern of coefficients for ΔCashHoldings.  If firms in a crisis 
disproportionately spend cash holdings protecting R&D, we expect negative coefficients for 





 Furthermore, we expect the largest (absolute value) coefficients for 
∆CashHoldings in the R&D regressions for the narrow time period that covers the peak of the financing 
crisis.  
An additional prediction concerns cuts in the stock of fixed capital to buffer R&D.  If firms run 
low on the amount of cash reserves available for investment buffering in any given period, the sale of 
non-core assets can also provide funds for buffering R&D.  Campello et al. (2010) report that among the 
constrained firms in their survey, 70% of the CFOs indicated that they sold more assets in the crisis than 
before.
8
  We also note that firms do not have to actually sell fixed capital to obtain extra resources for 
R&D.  Rather, as we discuss later in the paper, resources can be diverted to R&D by cutting fixed 
investment so aggressively that it does not cover depreciation of fixed capital.  In either case, if firms 
allowed the stock of fixed capital to fall in order to protect R&D in the crisis, changes in the stock of 
fixed capital (which we add to equation (4) in some regressions) will have a negative association with 
R&D.   
Our final prediction is that firms a priori most likely to face binding constraints at the start of the 
crisis should display stronger evidence of managing their liquidity and other assets to protect R&D.  
Consider, at the start of the crisis, a firm with investment well in excess of cash flows (e.g., a young firm).   
For such a firm, loss of access to finance will surely necessitate the use of stocks of liquidity if any 
buffering of investment levels is to occur. This need not be the case, however, for a firm whose 
investment levels are initially well below the flow of internal finance (e.g., mature firm) since a negative 
finance shock can be absorbed without drawing down stocks of liquidity to buffer investment.   
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 In addition to showing that firms use cash reserves to buffer investment, finding a negative relation between 
∆CashHoldings and R&D also suggests that our inferences are not being biased by misspecification or measurement 
error in the regression equation since these factors, if present, should impart an upward bias in the coefficient 
estimates (i.e., lead to positive coefficient estimates).  Fazzari and Petersen (1993) make this point when evaluating 
the connection between fixed investment and changes in working capital. 
8
 This is consistent with a number of previous studies showing that firms in financial distress make substantial use of 
asset sales to provide liquidity, and that otherwise constrained firms use some of the proceeds from asset sales for 
investment in fixed capital and R&D (e.g., Hovakimian and Titman, 2006; Borisova and Brown, 2013).  See 
Edmans and Mann (2012) for additional discussion and references.  
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3.    Data, Summary Statistics, and Median-Based Tests 
3.1.   Data and Industry Breakdown  
We construct the sample from publicly traded U.S. firms with coverage in the Compustat 
database.  We exclude firms with a primary SIC code from a regulated (SIC 4900-4999) or financial (SIC 
6000-6999) industry.  We then drop any firm-year observation if capital expenditures or sales is negative, 
total assets are less than $5 million in 2005 dollars, or sales growth is greater than 100%.  We also require 
that firms have seven annual R&D observations and seven fixed investment observations over the time 
period 2004-2010.  We begin in 2004 and insist on a minimum of seven observations in order to have 
some observations prior to the start of the crisis (changing the start date to 2003 or 2005 has no impact on 
our findings).  In addition, we are interested in the choices ongoing firms make when it comes to 
buffering alternative investments.  As such, we need firms engaged in both R&D and fixed investment 
and do not want our findings contaminated by either entering or exiting firms.
9
  That said, we have 
checked all results for an unbalanced sample using the (weaker) requirement that firms have data 
covering the period 2006-2009, which is essentially the minimum amount of data needed to estimate the 
dynamic model for the crisis period.   All of our findings and conclusions also hold in this unbalanced 
sample.  
Table 1 gives the industry breakdown (at the 2-digit SIC level) of the 1,009 firms in our main 
sample.  A total of 773 of the firms are contained in five broad two-digit industries: chemicals (28), 
industrial machinery and computers (35), electronic equipment (36), instruments (38) and business 
services (73).  It is not surprising that the majority of the sample falls into the main high-tech industries in 
the U.S., in part because the entire population of U.S. publicly traded companies is now concentrated in 
this set of industries.  For example, in 2007, 49 percent of all firms with coverage in Compustat are in one 
of the five high-tech industries. Thus, while the requirement that firms report R&D naturally leads to a 
sample concentrated in the high-tech sector, any broad sample of publicly traded firms will be heavily 
                                                 
9
 A possible concern with insisting on a balanced sample is that the firms most likely to have to cut investment either 
exit or are acquired by other firms, in which case our sample is composed of relatively successful firms and our 
findings would overstate the extent to which they can successfully buffer investment.  However, this issue would 
cause us to overstate the buffering of both fixed investment and R&D, and cannot explain the differential attention 
that surviving firms give to R&D investment.  Moreover, the issue of differential buffering may not be particularly 
relevant among firms that do not survive the crisis as all investment in these firms may collapse to zero (or near 
zero).      
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weighted towards high-tech. At the end of the paper, we discuss some findings for firms in the high-tech 
sector compared to firms outside of the high-tech sector.        
We focus on annual data for three reasons.  First, unlike fixed investment, a very large fraction of 
Compustat firms report R&D only at the annual frequency (and these firms tend to be younger and 
smaller firms).  Second, there are a number of problems (e.g., seasonality) encountered in using quarterly 
data, some of which are discussed in Kahle and Stulz (2013).  Third, the literature on investment and 
financing constraints, particularly studies estimating structural models, rarely employ quarterly data.  A 
likely reason is that there is a non-trivial “time to build” (e.g., Zhou, 2000), which potentially requires a 
large number of lags of financial variables when quarterly data is employed.   In particular, firms hit with 
a finance shock, even if they respond instantly, cannot immediately cut investment (e.g., within a quarter) 
because it takes time to receive and install equipment ordered in previous quarters.    
Using the rules stated above, our main sample (Full) has 1009 firms.  As will be apparent in the 
summary statistics, firms that do both R&D and fixed investment have a tendency to do less fixed 
investment than R&D.  We therefore report some results for a sub-set of the Full sample comprised of 
only firms with average fixed investment-to-assets ratios over 2004 to 2006 (years just prior to the crisis) 
of at least 0.03. There are 566 firms in this “HighCap” sample.  We use the 0.03 cutoff for capital 
spending because it yields a sample of firms having, on average, fairly similar levels of R&D and fixed 
investment prior to the start of the financial crisis.  Our results are completely unaffected for a wide range 
of alternative minimum cutoff values for fixed investment (e.g., 0.02 to 0.04).    
3.2. The Crisis Period and Descriptive Statistics 
 In our discussion of the summary statistics, we focus on 2008 and 2009, given that it is well 
known that the severity of the crisis increased dramatically starting in September of 2008.
10
 Table 2 
reports mean values of the key financing and investment ratios over the 2004-2010 period for both the 
Full and HighCap samples.  All variables are scaled by beginning of period total assets and we remove 
the 1% tail of the distribution in order to reduce the impact of outliers.  Cash flow is measured as gross of 
R&D, since R&D is expensed and we want to measure cash flow before expenditures on both R&D and 
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 The three-month LIBOR-OIS spread jumped enormously the second half of 2008, spiking at an all-time high of 
364 basis points in October of 2008.  Internal finance (cash flows) fell very sharply in 2008, as is evident in our 
summary statistics.  Furthermore, starting in late 2007, stock indexes collapsed (e.g., DOW fell more than 50%), 
leading to a drastic reduction in new equity issues during much of the crisis. 
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fixed capital.  Net stock issues are computed net of stock buybacks and net debt issues are funds from 
new long-term debt issues net of long-term debt reductions. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the Full sample of 1009 firms.  In the first 
column, compared to 2006 (the last year before the crisis), the mean of R&D is 7.2% lower in 2008 and 
2009.
11
  In contrast, in the second column, fixed investment (CAP) falls much more sharply: from 0.041 
in 2006 to 0.028 in 2009, a decline of approximately 32%.  Column three shows that the stock of (net) 
property plant and equipment is approximately 7% lower in both 2008 and 2009 compared to 2006.  
Turning to the financial variables, there is a severe decline in both internal and external finance in 2008 
and 2009.  Cash flow falls modestly in 2007 and then drops very sharply in 2008 (a 34% decline 
compared to 2006) and remains depressed in 2009 before recovering in 2010.  Debt issues actually rise in 
2007 but decline substantially in 2008 and are negative in 2009, consistent with a modest decline in the 
stock of total debt (last column) in 2009.  Finally, net stock issues become negative in 2008 and recover 
to some extent in 2009.  Importantly for our study, average cash holdings fall modestly in 2007 and then 
sharply in 2008 (22% decline compared to 2006).  The absolute size of this decline in cash holdings in 
2008 (0.050) is large enough to potentially offset most of the decline in cash flow and external finance 
that occurred in that year.  In 2009, however, average cash holdings increase, an issue we return to below.   
In Panel B of Table 2 we report the same set of summary statistics for the HighCap sample.  The 
only noteworthy difference in this subset of firms is the relatively higher level of fixed investment leading 
into the crisis period.  The average fixed investment ratio in the HighCap sample starts at 0.058 in 2006, 
before falling to 0.050 in 2008 (14% percent decline) and 0.036 in 2009 (38% decline compared to 2006).  
In contrast, the mean R&D ratio falls 14% between 2006 and 2009.  While the mean level of R&D is 
somewhat higher than fixed investment at the start of the crisis, the median value of both R&D and fixed 
investment is 0.048 in 2006 (not reported in Table 2).  The patterns of changes in the financial variables 
mirror those in Panel A.   
We briefly elaborate on two issues.  One might wonder why cash holdings did not decline even 
more in 2008.  Part of the reason is that cash holdings serve many roles besides buffering investment, 
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 The 2006 value of R&D is substantially above the value in 2004 and 2005 and thus may not be the most 
appropriate benchmark.  An alternative benchmark is the average of 2004-2006; compared to this benchmark, the 
decline in R&D in 2008 and 2009 is around 4%.  
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including providing short-term liquidity for day to day transactions.  Second, not all firms in our sample 
face severe constraints, even in the crisis, implying some firms need not turn to cash holdings to buffer 
investment.  Third, firms do not know the exact duration of a financial crisis.  In the event of a severe and 
long-lasting crisis, imprudent firms may run out of liquidity, potentially leading to the demise of the firm, 
implying a potentially large option value to preserving some cash holdings.  Finally, cash holdings in 
2008 did in fact fall by a large amount relative to the absolute decline in cash flow and external finance, 
so (on average) the fall in cash holdings in 2008 appears to be large enough to buffer much of the finance 
shock in that year.    
The second issue concerns average cash holdings at the end of 2009.  While the overall sample 
average cash holdings ratio is higher at the end of 2009, it is important to point out that for the full 
distribution of firms (not reported in Table 2), 32% did cut cash and 78% of these firms cut cash by at 
least 10% while 58% cut cash by at least 20%.  Thus, even in 2009, many firms in our sample cut cash 
holdings, potentially spending cash to buffer investment.
 
 In addition, the events in late 2008 and early 
2009 undoubtedly caused many businesses to adjust upwards their estimate of the crisis’s length and 
severity.  That is, the option value of liquidity in early 2009 likely rose relative to the option value in early 
2008, causing some firms to hoard liquidity to protect the firm in the event of being cut off from capital 
markets for a substantial period of time.  
If firms are surprised by the length (or severity) of a crisis and thus seek to rebuild cash holdings 
before the crisis abates, what does this imply for investment buffering?  Suppose a crisis is expected to 
last one period (period t) but in fact extends into period t+1.  Other things equal (e.g., loss of access to 
finance in t+1 is similar to period t), cuts to total investment should be more severe in period t+1 as the 
change in cash holdings is now positive. Nevertheless, firms can continue to buffer R&D even when 
compelled to rebuild cash holdings, and one way to do this is to make very sharp cuts to fixed investment: 
if firms cut fixed investment proportionately more than the negative shock to the availability of finance, 





  In addition, as noted above, firms can effectively make fixed investment negative by selling 
off assets, providing additional resources to buffer R&D.   
3.3. Within-Firm Changes in R&D and Fixed Investment  
 Given the importance to our study of differences in the relative magnitudes of investment 
declines, we present more details on the frequency and size of within-firm adjustments to R&D and fixed 
investment during the crisis.  For each firm, we compute the year-to-year percentage changes in R&D and 
fixed investment.  We focus on R&D and CAP ratios (as in Table 2), but the results are very similar if we 
look at investment levels instead.  First, Figure 1 shows that the median change in both R&D and fixed 
investment is small in 2007. More importantly, Figure 1 shows that the median change in R&D is 
approximately -2% in both 2008 and 2009; in sharp contrast, the median change in fixed investment is 
approximately -7% in 2008 and -26% in 2009.  Thus, at the height of the crisis, the median within-firm 
change in fixed investment is more than ten times greater than the median change in R&D.  Next, we 
create histograms (with bins at 10% intervals) based on all cuts to R&D (Figure 2a) and fixed investment 
(Figure 2b) between 2008 and 2009.  Figure 2a shows that when firms do cut R&D, the vast majority of 
cuts are modest (most are less than 20%).  In sharp contrast, Figure 2b shows that it is common for firms 
to make very large cuts in fixed investment, a substantial fraction of which exceed 50%.   
 Finally, we compare the relative size of the cuts in R&D and fixed investment among the firms 
cutting both R&D and fixed investment between 2008 and 2009.  For each of the 452 firms with cuts to 
both investments we divide the percent change in fixed investment by the percentage change in R&D, 
thereby comparing relative changes in fixed investment and R&D for the same firm. The full distribution 
of this measure is illustrated in Figure 3.  For only around 16% of the firms (74 firms) is the ratio less 
than one, indicating that, in percentage terms, very few firms cut R&D more than fixed investment.  
Furthermore, firms typically cut fixed investment much more than R&D, with 59% of the firms cutting 
fixed investment more than twice as much as R&D, and 24% cutting fixed investment at least five times 
as much.      
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 For example, suppose in the last pre-crisis period, cash flow = 150, fixed investment = 90 and R&D = 60, but in 
the crisis period cash flow falls to 100 (33% decline): a disproportionate reduction in fixed investment from 90 to 45 
(50% decline) diverts enough resources to nearly fully buffer all of R&D investment.  As we note below, our 
summary statistics do in fact suggest a disproportionately large cut in fixed investment (relative to the flow of 
finance) for many firms over the interval 2008 to 2009. 
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4. Main Results   
4.1.  GMM Estimation Approach  
We estimate equation (4) with the “system” GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel models 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This approach jointly estimates equation 
(4) in differences and in levels, using lagged levels as instruments for the regression in differences and 
lagged differences as instruments for the regression in levels. The sys-GMM estimator addresses the 
potential endogeneity of all financial variables as well as the dynamic panel bias induced from including 
the lagged dependent variable in a regression with a firm fixed effect and the approach is widely used to 
estimate dynamic panel regressions (e.g., Bond et al., 2003; Flannery and Hankins, 2013).  We report 
one-step GMM estimates using lagged levels dated t-3 and t-4 as instruments for the regression in 
differences and lagged differences dated t-2 for the regression in levels.  To assess instrument validity we 
report a Hansen J-test of the null that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, a difference-in-Hansen 
test that evaluates the validity of the instruments used in the levels equation, and an m2 test for second-
order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals.  These tests generally indicate no major problems 
with our primary instrument set, particularly in the most important specifications.  In all estimates we 
compute standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. 
4.2.  Estimates for R&D and Fixed Investment  
Table 3 reports estimates of equation (4) for both R&D and fixed investment.  We use the Full 
sample and report results for four different time periods: i) 2004-2010, ii) 2007-2009, iii) 2007-2008 and 
iv) 2008-2009. The longer time period includes years before and after the crisis and is used mainly for 
comparison purposes.  The 2007-2009 period, which we refer to as the “crisis period,” contains the key 
crisis years as well as 2007, the first, and mildest, year of the crisis.  While 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 
cover very brief periods, they provide additional insights into liquidity management as the crisis unfolded. 
We are able to estimate dynamic regressions for relatively short periods because we use lagged values 
from the pre-crisis period as instruments.  While Table 3 reports coefficient estimates on both current and 
lagged financial variables, to simplify the discussion we focus on the sum of the coefficients for each 
financial variable.  The chi-squared tests for the statistical significance of these sums are reported at the 
bottom of the table, together with test statistics evaluating instrument validity. 
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The results for R&D (first four columns) are in line with our expectations. In all four time 
periods, the point estimate for lagged R&D is near one.  Furthermore, the coefficient on lagged R&D-
squared is negative and statistically significant (except for the 2008-2009 period), consistent with our 
maintained assumptions concerning adjustment costs. For all four time periods, the sum of cash flow 
coefficients and stock issues coefficients is substantial and statistically significant.
13
  Most importantly, 
the sum of the ΔCashHoldings coefficients is negative (and significant) in all four time periods. 
Specifically, across the four time periods, the sum of the ΔCashHoldings coefficients is, respectively:       
-0.145, -0.186, -0.226 and -0.417.  Thus, changes in cash reserves share the strongest (negative) relation 
with R&D in 2008-2009, the most severe period of the crisis.   
The results for fixed investment (columns 5-8) are very different than those for R&D.  In all four 
time periods, the coefficient for lagged fixed investment is well below one, suggesting that, compared to 
R&D, fixed investment in period t is much less tightly connected to fixed investment in t-1. Of central 
importance to our exploration of liquidity management and investment protection during the financial 
crisis, the sum of the coefficients for ΔCashHoldings is far smaller (in absolute value) than in the R&D 
regressions. There is some evidence of limited use of cash holdings to buffer fixed investment in the 
2007-2008 period, which supports the findings in Duchin et al. (2010) of an association between cash 
holdings (at the start of the crisis) and the level of fixed investment in the first year of the crisis.  In the 
2008-2009 period (when ΔCashHoldings coefficients are the largest in the R&D regression) the sum of 
the coefficients for ΔCashHoldings in the fixed investment regression is essentially zero.  The coefficients 
on the other financial variables (cash flow and stock issues) are also quantitatively small, though often 
statistically significant or close to being significant at conventional levels.  It thus appears that the hit on 
fixed investment during the financial crisis is mainly captured in our regressions by the low coefficient on 
lagged fixed investment.   
4.3.   Alternative Controls for Demand 
 The empirical literature on financing constraints uses a variety of different measures to control for 
investment demand, including both Q and sales growth.  In Table 4, we replace current and lagged sales 
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 The finding that R&D investment is sensitive to stock issues during the crisis period is consistent with the equity-
dependent nature of R&D emphasized in several recent studies (e.g., Brown and Petersen, 2009; Brown et al., 2013; 
Hall and Lerner, 2010). 
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with Q and sales growth and report the results for the same time periods utilized in Table 3.  For the sake 
of readability, Table 4 (and subsequent tables) reports the sums of the coefficients (current and lagged), 
together with p-values from chi-squared tests that the sum is equal to zero.  In addition, we do not report 
coefficients for lagged R&D and fixed investment, which are similar to coefficients in the corresponding 
regressions in Table 3. The point estimates for Q are fairly large in most regressions (and typically 
somewhat larger in the R&D regressions) and the estimates are significant for both R&D and fixed 
investment regressions in the 2004-2010 and 2007-2009 periods. While the Q coefficients are also 
substantial in the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 periods, they are not significant, which is not surprising 
given the smaller number of observations in these shorter time periods.  Most importantly, the sums of 
coefficients for ΔCashHoldings in Table 4 are very similar to the corresponding sums in Table 3. Once 
again, for R&D, the ΔCashHoldings coefficients are quantitatively large (and significant), particularly in 
the peak years of the financial crisis.  For fixed investment, the ΔCashHoldings coefficients are 
quantitatively small in all time periods and only statistically significant in the 2004-2010 regression. So, 
using alternative controls for demand (as reported in Table 4) has no impact on the main findings in Table 
3.  
4.4.  Additional R&D Regressions  
 In Table 5, we consider modifications to the baseline specification to evaluate a different channel 
through which firms can buffer R&D.  To economize on space, we only report results for the 2004-2010 
and 2007-2009 periods.  Results for the shorter crisis intervals (2007-2008 and 2008-2009) are consistent 
with the results for the 2007-2009 interval.  We note that in all regressions, the coefficients on the lagged 
R&D terms are consistent with the estimates reported in Table 3.  In columns 1 and 2, we add the change 
in the stock of capital (ΔK) to our baseline specification.  If firms reduce the stock of fixed capital to 
increase available liquidity for buffering R&D, the estimated coefficient on ΔK will be negative.  The sum 
of the coefficients on ΔK is near zero for the 2004-2010 period (column 1).  In contrast, the sum of 
coefficients on ΔK is negative, statistically significant, and large in absolute value (-0.420) during the 
crisis period (column 2).  The lack of a ΔK finding in the broad 2004-2010 period, together with the 
sizable negative coefficient for ΔK in the narrow crisis period is logical: the use of fixed assets to buffer 
R&D is surely rather costly and is unlikely to be widely used except in a severe crisis.      
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 In columns 3 and 4, we check the robustness of the specification in columns 1 and 2 to the 
alternative demand controls used in Table 4 (Q and sales growth in place of levels of sales).  There are no 
quantitative changes in the sum of coefficients for either ΔCashHoldings or ΔK.  In columns 5 and 6, we 
eliminate lags of financial variables from equation (4), but do maintain the lagged R&D variables.  So the 
point estimates reported are not the sums, but rather the coefficients for contemporaneous financial 
variables.  The coefficient estimates in columns 5 and 6 are similar to the sums reported in columns 3 and 
4.  In particular, for the crisis period (column 6), the point estimate for ΔCashHoldings is -0.151 and the 
point estimate for ΔK is -0.452 (both are highly statistically significant).  
4.5.  Results for Firms a priori Most Likely to Face Binding Constraints 
 We next explore splits of the data based on proxies commonly used in the literature to separate 
firms into groups that are a priori more or less likely to face binding financing constraints.  We sort firms 
based on age, size, payout level and “bank dependence” in the years immediately preceding the start of 
the crisis.  Age is an especially attractive way to sort firms because age is less endogenous than other 
splitting criteria (Fee et al., 2009; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010).  Furthermore, young firms are more likely 
to have total investment in excess of the flow of internal finance, forcing them to make greater 
adjustments in the event of a collapse in access to external finance.  We compute firm age as the number 
of years since the firm first appears in Compustat with a non-missing stock price and consider firms 
young if their average age in the 2004 to 2006 period is 15 or less, and mature otherwise, the same age 
cutoff used in Brown et al. (2009).  To sort firms based on size and payout we first find firm averages of 
the book value of total assets and the net payout (dividends plus stock buybacks minus stock issues) ratio 
over the 2004 to 2006 period.  We then consider firms small (low payout) if their average assets (net 
payout ratio) is in the bottom 70
th
 percentile of sampled firms and large (high payout) otherwise.  Finally, 
our bank dependence measure is motivated by Duchin et al. (2010).  We consider firms “bank dependent” 
if they have no bond rating reported in Compustat and an average debt-to-assets ratio of at least 1% 
during the pre-crisis period (2004-2006).   All other firms are put in the “not bank dependent” group, 
which includes firms with a bond rating or with trivial levels of debt going into the crisis.     
 Table 6 reports regression results using the four alternative ways to sort constrained and 
unconstrained firms. We focus on the 2007-2009 time period and we report sums of the financial 
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coefficients as we did in Tables 4 and 5.  For young, small, low-payout and bank-dependent firms 
(columns 1, 3, 5 and 7), the sums of coefficients for ΔCashHoldings range from -0.200 to -0.302 and are 
always statistically significant, while the sums of coefficients for ΔK range from  -0.377 (p = 0.053)  to -
0.563 (p = 0.038).   In contrast, for the corresponding groups of “unconstrained” firms, the sums of 
coefficients for ΔCashHoldings range from 0.099 to -0.147 and are only statistically significant for 
mature firms, while the sums of coefficients for ΔK are always smaller (in absolute value) compared to  
“constrained” firms and are insignificant in all regressions with the exception of large firms (p-value = 
0.073).    
Overall, the findings in Table 6 show that the firms a priori most likely to face binding 
constraints during the crisis period display the strongest evidence of utilizing stocks of cash holdings and 
fixed assets to buffer R&D investment.  Moreover, these results provide additional evidence against a 
demand-side interpretation of our findings in Tables 3-5.  The logic is that demand shocks should impact 
all firms, while our findings for R&D buffering with cash holdings and stocks of fixed capital are 
concentrated among firms a priori more likely to be impacted by loss of access to finance during the 
crisis. 
4.6.  Quarterly Data and Difference-in-Differences Estimates  
We discussed earlier why we focus on annual data and not quarterly data.  However, one 
particular advantage of quarterly data is that we can zero in on narrow episodes of the recent financial 
crisis.  In particular, Duchin et al. (2010) use quarterly data and examine 2007Q3-2008Q2, or the initial 
phase of the crisis.  While this initial phase is a less severe financial shock than what came in late 2008 
and 2009, they point to the initial phase as predominantly a “supply phase.”  They find that firms with 
larger stocks of cash at the start of the crisis exhibit a significantly smaller decline in fixed investment 
during the 2007Q3-2008Q2 phase of the crisis.
14
  We therefore proceed in two ways.  First, we re-
estimate our main regressions (augmented with ΔK) for the 2007Q3-2008Q2 time period for all firms in 
our sample that report quarterly R&D data. The estimates of our main specification using quarterly data 
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 They find a weaker (and insignificant) connection between stocks of cash holdings and fixed investment for a 
later phase of the crisis (2008Q3-2009Q1).  They offer a number of explanations, including a weakening of their 
“instrument” as cash stocks are measured in 2006 and there were substantial declines in cash holdings in 2007 and 
2008 in their data.  A complementary explanation, suggested by our findings, is that as the crisis became more 
severe, tighter liquidity constraints forced firms to allocate virtually all available cash holdings to protect R&D, 
consistent with our very large sum of coefficients for ΔCashHoldings in the 2008-2009 time period. 
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(available on request) are qualitatively similar to the results reported above.  For example, when the 
regression contains current and three lags of quarterly financial variables, the sum of ΔCashHoldings 
coefficients in the R&D regression is approximately -0.100, statistically significant, and much larger than 
the corresponding sum of ΔCashHoldings coefficients in the fixed investment regression.15  
   Second, quarterly data also allows us to estimate a difference-in-differences regression motivated 
by the approach in Duchin et al. (2010).  They estimate a standard Q-model of investment and include an 
interaction between firm cash holdings prior to the start of the crisis and a dummy variable equal to one 
for all crisis quarters.  Their interest is identifying whether fixed investment during the crisis is higher for 
firms with larger cash reserves at the start of the crisis.  We can build on this approach to explore whether 
firm use of cash reserves for R&D buffering is higher during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis 
period, as our arguments would suggest.  We construct an indicator variable (EarlyCrisis) that is equal to 
one for the four quarters 2007Q3-2008Q2 and zero otherwise. We then interact the EarlyCrisis dummy 
variable with firm ΔCashHoldings, and it is this interaction which captures whether there is a difference 
in firm use of cash holdings for investment between the 2007Q3-2008Q2 and the pre-crisis period. We 
also explore the use of cash for investment buffering deeper into the crisis (following Table 10 in the 
Duchin et al. (2010) study).  To do this we include observations from the 2008Q3-2009Q2 interval and 
construct a new indicator variable (LateCrisis) that equals one in each of these quarters and zero 
otherwise.  In each case we use observations from 2006Q3-2007Q2 for the pre-crisis period.  
 In Table 7, we report the difference-in-differences estimates for R&D in the first three columns, 
and fixed investment in the last three columns.  We start with a specification that includes only Q, Cash 
flow, ΔCashHoldings, and the interaction between ΔCashHoldings and EarlyCrisis. The EarlyCrisis 
indicator variable does not enter separately because we include dummy variables for each quarter.  Other 
than our focus on quarterly changes in cash holdings (ΔCashHoldings) rather than the pre-crisis level of 
cash, this specification follows the main difference-in-differences regression in Duchin et al. (2010). 
While they use a standard within-firm estimator, we continue our approach of instrumenting all financial 
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 As expected, if we use fewer lags of financial variables, the sum of ΔCashHoldings coefficients is smaller, but the 
qualitative pattern of findings does not change.  For example, with only one lag of financial variables, the sum of 
ΔCashHoldings coefficients is -0.051 (and significant) in the R&D regression and -0.023 (and insignificant) in the 
fixed investment regression. 
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variables with lagged values, an issue that is more important in our setting given our focus on changes in 
cash during the crisis period and our inclusion of firm stock issues in some specifications. 
 The estimates for R&D in column (1) show a significant negative coefficient on the interaction 
variable ΔCashHoldings*EarlyCrisis.  This indicates that, within-firms, there is differentially more R&D 
buffering per dollar of cash spent in the early crisis interval (2007Q3-2008Q2) than in the pre-crisis 
interval (2006Q3-2007Q2).  In column (2) we include Stock issues and our estimate of the differential 
effect is even stronger.  Notably, the estimates in column (2) show a coefficient on ΔCashHoldings of       
-0.032 during the pre-crisis quarters and -0.093 during the early crisis quarters (-0.032 + -0.061), the latter 
of which is consistent in both sign and magnitude with the quarterly regression results noted above.  In 
column (3), we interact each of the three financial variables with the EarlyCrisis dummy variable and 
continue to find a significant negative coefficient on the ΔCashHoldings*EarlyCrisis interaction.16  
Moreover, the estimates in column (3) indicate that ΔCashHoldings is the only financial factor that 
increases in importance for R&D when moving from the pre-crisis to early-crisis quarters. Finally, in 
column (4) we use data from 2006Q3-2009Q2 and estimate a specification that includes both the 
ΔCashHoldings*EarlyCrisis and the ΔCashHoldings*LateCrisis interaction variables. The estimates in 
column (4) show a negative and significant coefficient on both of these interaction terms.  In fact, the 
coefficient estimate is larger (in absolute value) for the ΔCashHoldings*LateCrisis interaction, which is 
consistent with the very large ΔCashHoldings estimates we find using annual data for the 2008-2009 
period in Table 3.  
In the final three columns we report a similar set of regressions for fixed investment.  In sharp 
contrast to the results for R&D, the difference-in-differences results suggest that firms do not allocate 
more cash to fixed investment during the crisis, consistent with earlier evidence (in particular Table 3).  
Overall, the findings in Table 7, which are based on a very different empirical approach than used earlier 
in the paper, support our conclusions that firms doing both R&D and fixed investment allocated cash to 
protect the later and not the former during the recent crisis.  
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 We have estimated similar regressions using the annual data and draw identical conclusions about the increasing 
allocation of cash reserves to R&D during the crisis. For example, if we run the difference-in-differences regression 
with 2007-2009 as the “crisis” period and 2004-2006 as the pre-crisis period, the coefficient estimate on the 
ΔCashHoldings*Crisis interaction is -0.239 (p-value=0.046). If we exclude 2007 from the regression since this is 




5.  Additional Tests 
 In this section we provide some tests of robustness by exploring different instrument sets as well 
as splits of the main sample into high-tech and low-tech firms.  We also provide some additional findings 
for fixed investment using alternative samples, including a broad sample that is made up primarily of 
firms not reporting R&D.  All results not reported in a table are available on request.  
5.1.   Different Instrument Sets     
 The GMM estimator we use relies on lagged values of the regression variables for instruments.  
We use lags t-3 to t-4 in our main results for two reasons: i) overall, the specification tests indicate no 
major problems with this instrument set, and ii) using all available lags as instruments results in a 
proliferation of instruments that potentially weakens the specification tests and overfits the endogenous 
variables (e.g., Roodman, 2009).  Nonetheless, because there can be efficiency gains from including more 
of the available lags as instruments and to explore the robustness of our results, we estimated all main 
regressions with deeper lags included in the instrument set and get very similar results.  For example, 
focusing on the Full sample and the 2007-2009 time period, if we estimate the R&D regression using all 
available lags as instruments (starting with t-3), the estimate on ΔCashHoldings is -0.148 and significant 
at the 1% level, whereas the corresponding estimate in the CAP regression is essentially zero. We also get 
similar results if we start the instruments one period sooner (t-2), though in this case the specification 
tests weaken considerably in some regressions. 
5.2.  High-Tech vs. Low-Tech Splits of Data 
Table 1 shows that the majority of our sample falls within five broad two-digit high-tech 
industries.  A logical question is whether our findings on the use of cash during the crisis are driven only 
by high-tech companies protecting R&D, or if they extend to R&D activities in other sectors as well.  
When we re-estimate our main regressions for the “high-tech” portion of the sample only, the sum of 
coefficients on ΔCashHoldings is -0.157 (p-value=0.026).  In the “low-tech” firms, the corresponding 
estimate is -0.121 (p-value=0.121).  Moreover, among the low-tech firms with substantial R&D 
expenditures (R&D ratio of at least 0.05 during the pre-crisis interval), the estimate on ΔCashHoldings is 
very similar in magnitude to the estimate for the high-tech sample (-0.159). Thus, though our estimates 
for the low-tech sample are not as precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size, our results suggest 
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that both high-tech and non-high-tech companies were interested in protecting R&D during the crisis 
period, particularly those non-high-tech companies with substantial R&D activities to protect.   
5.3.  Additional Fixed Investment Regressions: Alternative Samples 
 The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that firms doing both R&D and fixed investment allocated 
little or no cash holdings to protect fixed investment during the financial crisis.  It is possible that we find 
relatively little evidence of firms using ΔCashHoldings for fixed investment in these regressions because 
the level of fixed investment is smaller than the level of R&D in the Full sample (see Panel A of Table 2).  
We explore this possibility by estimating regressions for the HighCap sample, where fixed investment 
and R&D levels are similar (see the discussion of Panel B, Table 2).  The first two columns of Table 8 
report fixed investment results using equation (4).  For the 2004-2010 and the 2007-2009 periods, the sum 
of coefficients for ΔCashHoldings is small (-0.033 and -0.034) and statistically insignificant.  These point 
estimates are very similar to the corresponding estimates for the full sample in Table 3.  
 In columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 we add new long-term debt issues to the regression and also drop 
lags of financial variables.  (The intermediate step – where we include debt issues in a specification with 
lags of all financial variables – yields very similar results.)  Since fixed investments provide much more 
collateral value than R&D, it is reasonable to explore the impact of adding debt financing in the fixed 
investment regressions.  For both the 2004-2010 and the 2007-2009 periods, the coefficient on new debt 
issues is positive and statistically significant, but, once again, the coefficient for ΔCashHoldings remains 
small and insignificant. Thus, our findings on the use of ΔCashHoldings for fixed investment are similar 
whether we focus on the Full or HighCap sample of firms doing R&D. 
In the second half of Table 8 we consider an entirely new sample (BroadCap) that includes firms 
we initially excluded from the sample due to lack of information on R&D.  Many firms report information 
on fixed investment but no information on R&D.  Absence of R&D information likely means that R&D is 
zero or trivial, since firms that fail to report R&D are typically in industries that traditionally do little 
R&D.  To construct the BroadCap sample we simply drop the requirement that firms report R&D.  The 
idea is that when R&D is not competing for scarce stocks of liquidity, firms may be more willing to 
allocate cash holdings to protect fixed investment.  As Table 8 shows, including firms doing little or no 
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R&D increases the sample size a great deal, and thus the BroadCap sample is heavily weighted towards 
firms doing little or no R&D.  
Columns 5 and 6 report estimates of our baseline regression for the 2004-2010 and 2007-2009 
periods.  Of particular interest, the coefficient estimates on ΔCashHoldings are statistically significant and 
fairly substantial (-0.132 and -0.149).  In column 7 we continue to focus on the 2007-2009 period and 
report estimates of the specification that includes debt issues but drops lags of the financial variables. The 
coefficient estimates on cash flow, stock issues and debt issues are positive and statistically significant. 
More importantly, the coefficient on ΔCashHoldings (-0.104) remains sizeable and statistically 
significant.  However, as with the regressions in columns 5 and 6, the test statistics evaluating instrument 
validity are poor for the BroadCap results reported in column 7.  We therefore estimate the regression 
using difference GMM instead of system GMM and report the results in column 8.  The results using this 
alternative estimator also show a substantial negative (-0.171) and significant relation between 
ΔCashHoldings and fixed investment. Furthermore, the Hansen J-test indicates no problems with 
instrument validity.  Thus, the BroadCap results in Table 8 suggest that during the recent crisis some 




  We note that these findings for the BroadCap sample provide additional evidence against a 
demand-side interpretation of our overall findings.  Suppose the only reason we find evidence that firms 
protect R&D far more than fixed investment during the crisis is because: i) demand fell more for fixed 
investment than for R&D, and ii) our demand-side controls are inadequate.   If this demand-side story is 
the principal explanation, we should not find evidence of cash holdings being used to protect fixed 
investment in any samples of firms.  Instead, once the sample consists primarily of firms where R&D is 
not competing for scarce stocks of liquidity, we find that firms do in fact use cash reserves to buffer fixed 
investment.   
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 If we divide the BroadCap sample into those firms doing R&D (our main sample) and those firms not in our main 
sample (low or no R&D), we find evidence of fixed investment smoothing only in the low/no R&D firms.  
Specifically, the coefficient estimate (p-value) on ΔCashHoldings is -0.237 (0.065) in the low/no R&D subsample 
and -0.045 (0.074) for R&D firms.  This is precisely what we expect, given the fact that in our main sample, we 
found no evidence of fixed investment smoothing for firms reporting R&D information. 
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6.   Conclusion  
We study how firms prioritize across competing real investments when they encounter a severe 
negative finance shock.  Since adjustment costs for R&D likely increase much faster than those for fixed 
investment, we expect firms to allocate a disproportionate amount of available liquidity to R&D during 
periods when access to finance declines sharply.  We study the recent financial crisis and find strong 
support for this idea.  First, we find that the large majority of firms engaged in both fixed investment and 
R&D cut the former far more than the latter.  Second, we estimate dynamic investment regressions that 
include the changes in cash holdings, allowing us to directly explore how firms spend liquidity to support 
investment. These regressions show that firms allocate a disproportionate share of cash holdings to buffer 
R&D and even take the extreme step of allowing their stock of fixed capital to fall in order to support 
R&D.  This favorable treatment of R&D compared to fixed investment is particularly pronounced in the 
firms who a priori were likely to face the most severe financing constraints during the crisis.  We also 
find that firms engaged in no (or very little) R&D – and thus where R&D is not a competing use of funds 
– do allocate cash holdings to buffer fixed investment.  Overall, our findings demonstrate that when firms 
must prioritize among competing real investments during a crisis, they allocate liquidity primarily to 
protect R&D.  Based on these findings, we conclude with some final thoughts on the private and public 
benefits of cash holdings.    
In the recent crisis, aggregate industrial R&D did not fall in 2008 and declined by 2.9% in 2009 
(in nominal terms), far less than aggregate fixed investment.  Given how dramatically internal finance and 
stock issues fell, it is hard not to conclude that collectively firms were rather successful at protecting 
R&D.  Since our sample contains a large fraction of total corporate R&D, our findings suggest that cash 
holdings played an important role in protecting aggregate R&D, which arguably mitigated some of the 
long-run costs of the crisis.  The rationale is that unlike fixed investment, there are large “spillovers” from 
new knowledge creation, suggesting that the social returns to R&D can be very large (see the reviews in 
Griliches, 1992, and Hall et al., 2010), making R&D a critical driver of economic growth (e.g., Romer, 
1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).   
  Bates et al. (2009) report that cash holdings (per dollars of assets) was at an all-time high just 





  Duchin et al. (2010) explore the connection between cash holdings and investment during the 
recent crisis and conclude (p. 423) that “seemingly excess cash may in fact benefit firms in times of 
dislocation in markets for external finance.”  Our results support this view, but with the important 
qualification that cash holdings in times of dislocation appear to be most beneficial to R&D-intensive 
firms compared to more traditional companies.  Moreover, to the extent that R&D buffering has the 
economy-wide benefits discussed above, cash holdings can produce substantial benefits that are external 
to the firm. This implies that for many R&D-intensive firms, “seemingly excess cash” from a private 
point of view may in fact be closer to what is socially optimal. 
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We modify the standard dynamic optimization model used in Love (2003) and a number of other 
studies (e.g., Whited, 1992; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998).  Similar to Hall (1995), one modification is 
that output is a function of both fixed capital (K) and technology (T), rather than just fixed capital and we 
follow the literature in assuming a one-period time to build lag for both investments. Quantity of 
investment in fixed capital is denoted by I and investment in technology is denoted by RD and prices of 




.  A second modification is that we allow the firm to have positive 
cash holdings, which can be used (drawn down) to partially relax financing constraints during a crisis.  To 
simplify, we ignore debt finance (as does Love (2003)), which has no impact on the first-order conditions 
considered below.    
Managers are assumed to maximize the expected present value of dividends subject to the capital 
accumulation and financing constraints.  Equations (A1)-(A6) characterize the problem:                                                                          
                                                                         ∞ 
        Vt (Kt, Tt, ξt )  =   max { Dt   +   Et[ ∑  βt+s-1 Dt+s  ] }                                               (A1)  
                                     {It+s, RDt+s}s=0        s=1  
  subject to  
       Dt     =    П (Kt , Tt , ξt)  -  P
I
t It  -  P
RD
t RDt  -  ( It,  Kt-1 )
  
-
  ( RDt , Tt-1)  -  ∆ CHt                    (A2) 
       Kt+1  =      Kt     +   It                                                                                        (A3) 
       Tt+1   =     Tt   +   RDt                                                                                                                                      (A4) 
       CHt+1   =   CHt   + ∆ CHt                                                                                         (A5) 
       Dt      ≥   0.                                                   (A6)                                           
In equation (A1), ξt is a productivity shock, Dt is the dividend paid to shareholders, βt+s-1 is a 
discount factor from period t+s to period t and Et is the expectation conditional on information known at 
time t.  Equation (A2) is the “sources and uses” condition and determines the size of dividends.  As is 
standard in the literature, adjustment costs for fixed investment (( It , Kt-1)) are assumed to be convex 
and depend on the level of both I and K (e.g., typical to assume  depends on I/K).  Symmetrically, we 
assume the adjustment costs for R&D ( (RDt , Tt-1)) are convex and depend on the level of both R&D 
and T (e.g.,  Hall, 1995; Hall and Lerner, 2010).  In equation (A2), ∆ CHt is the change in the level of cash 
holdings (CH), which can be either positive (use of funds) or negative (source of funds).  Equations (A3), 
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(A4) and (A5) describe the path of accumulating fixed capital, technology and cash holdings, ignoring 
depreciation (which adds no additional insights to the analysis).   
 Equation (A6) introduces financing constraints in the manner commonly done in the literature 
(e.g., Love, 2003):  there is a non-negativity constraint on dividends (i.e., no new share issues).   The 
multiplier on this constraint, λt, is the shadow value to the firm of being able to obtain equity finance by 
paying negative dividends (or generating additional internal equity finance).  Within this framework, one 
way to think of a financing crisis is as a sharp decline in the availability of internally generated finance 
(i.e., sharp fall in П(Kt , Tt)), which was a major feature of the 2007-2009 crisis.  Alternatively, one could 
assume that firms face perfect capital markets and can issue new external equity during normal times (λ = 
0) and Equation (A6) is only present during a financing crisis (λ > 0).  The Euler conditions for the 
constrained maximization problem are given in equations (1) and (2) in Section II of the paper. 
It is important to point out the key role of cash holdings in equation (A2) for relaxing financing 
constraints during a crisis.   Suppose a crisis occurs in period t, shutting down all access to external 
finance.   Spending down cash holdings makes it possible for    
                              P
I
 It  +  P
RD
 RDt  >   П (Kt , Tt) – adjustment costs  
without necessarily violating equation (A6).  Given that Пt often becomes negative during a financing 
crisis, firms with no cash reserves could be forced to cut total investment to zero and possibly still not 
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Figure 1. Median within-firm percentage change in R&D and fixed investment.  The reported value 







Figure 2a. Histogram of the percentage size of firm cuts to R&D (2008-2009). Reported for the 543 






Figure 2b. Histogram of the percentage size of firm cuts to fixed investment (2008-2009). Reported 
for the 746 sampled firms with cuts to fixed investment between 2008 and 2009. The full sample is 







Figure 3. Distribution of the percent change in fixed investment divided by the percent change in 
R&D (2008-2009). Reported for the 452 sampled firms with cuts to both fixed investment and R&D from 
2008 to 2009.  The full sample is described in Table 1.
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Table 1:  Firm count by industry 
 
The table reports the number of firms by 2-digit SIC code. The sample is constructed from publicly-traded firms 
with coverage in the Compustat database during 2004-2010.  Firms with a SIC code from a regulated or financial 
industry (SIC 4900-4999 or 6000-6999) are excluded.  Firm-year observations are excluded if capital expenditures 
or sales are negative, total assets are less than $5 million (in 2005 dollars), or if sales growth is greater than 100%.  
Firms without seven R&D observations and seven fixed investment (CAP) observations over 2004-2010 are 
excluded.     
 
Industry 2-digit SIC codes Firm count Share of sample 
    
Ag, Mining, and Construction 01-17 7 0.007 
Food 20 12 0.012 
Tobacco 21 4 0.004 
Textiles 22 2 0.002 
Apparel 23 1 0.001 
Lumber and wood 24 3 0.003 
Furniture 25 13 0.013 
Paper 26 18 0.018 
Printing and publishing 27 2 0.002 
Chemicals 28 137 0.136 
Petroleum 29 6 0.006 
Rubber and plastics 30 13 0.013 
Leather 31 2 0.002 
Pottery and glass 32 9 0.009 
Primary metals 33 12 0.012 
Fabricated metal products 34 23 0.023 
Machinery and computers 35 124 0.123 
Electronics 36 209 0.207 
Transportation equipment 37 48 0.048 
Instruments 38 164 0.163 
Misc manufacturing 39 16 0.016 
Transportation and communications 40-49 10 0.010 
Wholesale and retail trade 50-59 14 0.014 
Non-business services 70-72, 74-89 21 0.021 
Business services 73 139 0.138 
    High-tech industries 28, 35, 36, 38, 73 773 0.766 
    




Table 2:  Sample characteristics by year 
 
The table reports average values of key investment and financing variables for each year from 2004 to 2010. Panel 
A (1009 firms) reports average values for the full sample of firms (Full sample), and Panel B (566 firms) reports 
average values for a sub-set of the full sample comprised of firms with average fixed investment-to-assets ratios 
over 2004-2006 of at least 0.03 (HighCap sample).  All averages are computed after excluding the 1% tails.  All 
variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. The sample is described in detail in Table 1.  
 













Panel A: Full sample 
2004 0.081 0.038 0.191 0.153 0.035 0.004 0.282 0.211 
2005 0.077 0.040 0.178 0.149 0.014 0.004 0.277 0.209 
2006 0.083 0.041 0.181 0.154 0.016 0.010 0.271 0.215 
2007 0.080 0.040 0.175 0.148 0.003 0.012 0.262 0.217 
2008 0.077 0.038 0.168 0.102 -0.013 0.009 0.212 0.213 
2009 0.077 0.028 0.168 0.107 0.011 -0.007 0.255 0.202 
2010 0.080 0.032 0.170 0.150 0.011 0.002 0.272 0.202 
Panel B: HighCap sample 
2004 0.079 0.054 0.242 0.173 0.037 0.006 0.253 0.206 
2005 0.076 0.058 0.232 0.168 0.012 0.005 0.241 0.213 
2006 0.080 0.058 0.239 0.171 0.018 0.011 0.239 0.218 
2007 0.075 0.053 0.228 0.162 0.003 0.015 0.237 0.219 
2008 0.072 0.050 0.220 0.120 -0.011 0.012 0.186 0.223 
2009 0.069 0.036 0.217 0.114 0.012 -0.004 0.226 0.208 




Table 3:  R&D and fixed investment regressions during the financial crisis 
 
The table reports estimates of equation (4) with R&D as the dependent variable in the first four columns and fixed 
capital investment (CAP) as the dependent variable in the last four columns. Estimation is by systems GMM with 
lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the equation in differences and lagged differences dated t-2 
used as instruments for the equation in levels.  Fixed firm and time effects are included in all regressions.  The 
regression sample is the Full sample described in Table 1.  Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within- 
firm serial correlation are reported in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level. 
 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INVt-1 1.024 1.110 1.313 1.036 0.685 0.610 0.762 0.625 
 (0.072)*** (0.131)*** (0.208)*** (0.167)*** (0.119)*** (0.234)*** (0.381)** (0.289)** 
INV
2
t-1 -0.453 -0.942 -1.702 -0.493 -0.637 0.316 -0.562 1.260 
 (0.184)** (0.403)** (0.627)*** (0.471) (0.746) (1.507) (2.237) (1.880) 
Salest 0.028 -0.003 -0.004 -0.024 0.036 0.032 0.024 0.065 
 (0.014)** (0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.008)*** (0.018)* (0.021) (0.017)*** 
Salest-1 -0.030 -0.005 -0.015 0.010 -0.030 -0.023 -0.017 -0.063 
 (0.014)** (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.008)*** (0.018) (0.020) (0.016)*** 
CashFlowt 0.068 0.178 0.224 0.148 0.008 0.023 0.027 -0.013 
 (0.035)** (0.068)*** (0.092)** (0.091) (0.022) (0.044) (0.051) (0.060) 
CashFlowt-1 0.012 -0.065 -0.078 -0.006 0.026 0.023 0.013 0.067 
 (0.034) (0.054) (0.082) (0.045) (0.017) (0.035) (0.044) (0.029)** 
StkIssuest 0.128 0.284 0.329 0.261 0.026 0.040 0.052 -0.012 
 (0.041)*** (0.054)*** (0.081)*** (0.072)*** (0.017) (0.033) (0.050) (0.051) 
StkIssuest-1 -0.037 -0.085 -0.035 0.009 0.009 0.016 0.011 0.045 
 (0.037) (0.055) (0.079) (0.076) (0.016) (0.024) (0.035) (0.032) 
ΔCashHoldingst -0.057 -0.131 -0.163 -0.249 -0.009 -0.015 -0.011 -0.020 
 (0.041) (0.054)** (0.066)** (0.070)*** (0.021) (0.034) (0.050) (0.043) 
ΔCashHoldingst-1 -0.088 -0.055 -0.063 -0.168 -0.011 -0.024 -0.060 0.019 
 (0.028)*** (0.047) (0.071) (0.081)** (0.016) (0.025) (0.044) (0.040) 
         
Sum CashFlow 0.003 0.029 0.038 0.075 0.027 0.087 0.251 0.277 
(p-value from Chi-squared test)       
Sum StkIssues 0.079 0.014 0.008 0.016 0.030 0.062 0.165 0.494 
(p-value from Chi-squared test)       
Sum ΔCash 0.003 0.015 0.019 0.002 0.459 0.311 0.134 0.995 
(p-value from Chi-squared test)       
m2 1.650 0.260   -0.390 -2.000   
Hansen J-test 0.397 0.590 0.837 0.866 0.015 0.215 0.873 0.405 
Diff-Hansen 0.497 0.240 0.545 0.318 0.007 0.318 0.705 0.568 
Obs 7,001 3,027 2,018 2,018 7,001 3,027 2,018 2,018 





Table 4:  R&D and fixed investment regressions: Alternative demand controls 
 
The table reports estimates of equation (4) with Q and sales growth used as demand controls in place of current and 
lagged sales. R&D is the dependent variable in the first four columns and fixed capital investment (CAP) is the 
dependent variable in the last four columns. Estimation is by systems GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used 
as instruments for the equation in differences and lagged differences dated t-2 used as instruments for the equation 
in levels.  Fixed firm and time effects are included in all regressions. The regression sample is the Full sample 
described in Table 1.  The table reports the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged financial variables.  The 
values in italics are p-values from Chi-squared tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are equal to 
zero after adjusting standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. 
 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Q 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
p-value 0.014 0.033 0.131 0.526 0.018 0.002 0.133 0.071 
         
Sales growth -0.035 -0.057 -0.068 -0.004 0.024 0.028 -0.009 0.050 
p-value 0.048 0.057 0.220 0.869 0.024 0.079 0.678 0.000 
         
Cash flow 0.072 0.093 0.097 0.068 0.024 0.038 0.037 -0.011 
p-value 0.007 0.032 0.131 0.203 0.137 0.112 0.184 0.761 
         
Stock issues 0.098 0.224 0.321 0.218 0.009 0.012 0.051 -0.006 
p-value 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.592 0.676 0.242 0.892 
         
ΔCashHoldings -0.199 -0.244 -0.280 -0.356 -0.052 -0.035 -0.033 -0.030 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.027 0.314 0.417 0.574 
         
m2 1.46 -0.50   -1.39 -1.61   
Hansen J-test 0.187 0.345 0.638 0.592 0.003 0.233 0.473 0.606 
Diff-Hansen 0.143 0.084 0.439 0.059 0.018 0.749 0.208 0.514 
         
Obs 6,993 3,024 2,016 2,016 6,993 3,024 2,016 2,016 






Table 5:  R&D regressions: Alternative specifications 
 
The table reports alternative specifications of the dynamic R&D regression. Estimation is by systems GMM with 
lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the equation in differences and lagged differences dated t-2 
used as instruments for the equation in levels.  Fixed firm and time effects are included in all regressions.  The 
regression sample is the Full sample described in Table 1. In columns (1)-(4) the table reports the sum of the 
coefficients on current and lagged financial variables. The model in columns (5) and (6) excludes lags of the 
financial variables and reports the coefficient estimate on the contemporaneous term only.  The values in italics are 
p-values from Chi-squared tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are equal to zero after adjusting 




Add change in stock of 
fixed assets 
Use alternative demand 
controls 















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cash flow 0.087 0.161 0.076 0.122 0.069 0.138 
p-value 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.015 0.003 
       
Stock issues 0.113 0.260 0.106 0.238 0.124 0.310 
p-value 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.041 0.000 
       
ΔCashHoldings -0.163 -0.224 -0.199 -0.254 -0.051 -0.151 
p-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.230 0.012 
       
ΔK -0.005 -0.420 0.012 -0.424 -0.155 -0.452 
p-value 0.962 0.028 0.905 0.027 0.122 0.010 
       
m2 1.49 -0.33 1.44 -0.90 1.52 -0.60 
Hansen J-test 0.583 0.785 0.367 0.415 0.051 0.540 
Diff-Hansen 0.636 0.415 0.294 0.113 0.004 0.113 
       
Obs 7,001 3,027 6,993 3,024 7,001 3,027 




Table 6:  R&D regressions: Sample splits 
 
The table reports separate estimates of equation (4) for groups of firms sorted on the ex ante likelihood they face 
binding financing constraints. Firms are sorted based on characteristics in the pre-crisis (2004-2006) interval. 
Estimation is by systems GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the equation in differences 
and lagged differences dated t-2 used as instruments for the equation in levels.  Fixed firm and time effects are 
included in all regressions.  The regression sample is the Full sample described in Table 1 and the sample period is 
2007-2009.  The table reports the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged financial variables. The values in 
italics are p-values from Chi-squared tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are equal to zero after 
adjusting standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation.  
 
 Age Size Payout Bank dependence 
 Young Mature Small Large Low High Yes No 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (5) (6) 
Cash flow 0.176 0.142 0.151 0.233 0.154 -0.093 0.155 0.066 
p-value 0.001 0.078 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.094 0.014 0.210 
         
Stock issues 0.299 0.154 0.243 0.156 0.260 -0.026 0.303 0.090 
p-value 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.579 0.001 0.377 
         
ΔCashHoldings -0.241 -0.147 -0.205 0.006 -0.200 0.099 -0.302 -0.081 
p-value 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.964 0.004 0.216 0.001 0.249 
         
ΔK -0.563 -0.184 -0.377 -0.331 -0.456 0.341 -0.489 -0.004 
p-value 0.038 0.265 0.053 0.073 0.030 0.129 0.056 0.977 
         
m2 -0.180 -1.000 -0.240 0.200 -0.470 0.940 -0.29 0.79 
Hansen J-test 0.929 0.566 0.784 0.056 0.906 0.962 0.847 0.581 
Diff-Hansen 0.614 0.736 0.478 0.001 0.466 0.503 0.113 0.044 
         
Obs 1,605 1,422 2,118 909 2,118 909 2208 819 




Table 7: Difference-in-differences regressions  
 
The table reports estimates of difference-in-differences regressions using quarterly data. In the first four columns 
R&D-to-total assets is the dependent variable and in the last three columns fixed investment-to-total assets is the 
dependent variable. The sample is all firms in the Full sample with sufficient quarterly data. EarlyCrisis is a dummy 
variable equal to one for each quarter between 2007Q3 and 2008Q2, and zero otherwise. LateCrisis is a dummy 
variable equal to one for each quarter between 2008Q3 and 2009Q2, and zero otherwise. In all columns except (4), 
the sample period is 2006Q3-2008Q2. In column (4) the sample period is 2006Q3-2009Q2. Estimation is by systems 
GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-8 used as instruments for the equation in differences and lagged differences 
dated t-2 used as instruments for the equation in levels. Fixed firm and quarterly time effects are included in all 
regressions. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation are reported in 
parenthesis.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 















Full set of 
interactions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Q 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Cash flow -0.015 0.014 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.024 
 (0.047) (0.039) (0.043) (0.027) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 
        
Cash flow*EarlyCrisis   0.029    -0.023 
   (0.032)    (0.013)* 
        
Stock issues  0.115 0.114 0.114  0.006 0.016 
  (0.036)*** (0.035)*** (0.034)***  (0.012) (0.014) 
        
Stock issues*EarlyCrisis   0.009   0.006 -0.028 
   (0.049)   (0.012) (0.019) 
        
ΔCashHoldings 0.011 -0.032 -0.028 -0.027 -0.007 -0.008 -0.014 
 (0.016) (0.015)** (0.016)* (0.014)* (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)* 
        
ΔCashHoldings* -0.056 -0.061 -0.073 -0.052 0.006 0.000 0.015 
  EarlyCrisis (0.029)** (0.024)** (0.037)** (0.022)** (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
        
ΔCashHoldings*    -0.080    
  LateCrisis    (0.030)***    
        
m2 -.50 -0.76 -0.69 -2.09 -0.87 -0.92 -0.78 
Hansen J-test 0.168 0.414 0.377 0.028 0.223 0.439 0.485 
Diff-Hansen 0.009 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.104 0.650 0.569 
        
Obs 5,767 5,766 5,766 8,681 5,817 5,817 5,817 




Table 8:  Fixed investment regressions: Alternative samples  
 
The table reports dynamic investment regressions with fixed investment as the dependent variable.  In columns (1)-
(4) the regression sample is the HighCap sample described in Table 1.  In columns (5)-(8) the regression sample 
includes all firms in the Full sample plus the firms that were excluded due to lack of R&D information.  In columns 
(1)-(7) estimation is by systems GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the equation in 
differences and lagged differences dated t-2 used as instruments for the equation in levels.  In column (8) estimation 
is by difference GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the differenced regression equation.  
Fixed firm and time effects are included in all regressions. Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) report the sum of the 
coefficients on current and lagged financial variables.  The models in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) exclude lags of the 
financial variables and so the reported value is the coefficient estimate on the contemporaneous term only.  The 
values in italics are p-values from Chi-squared tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are equal to 
zero after adjusting standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. 
      
 
 HighCap Sample BroadCap Sample 
 Baseline regression 
Add debt issues, drop 
lags 
Baseline regression 



















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash flow 0.046 0.051 0.036 0.056 0.102 0.121 0.150 0.232 
p-value 0.019 0.099 0.031 0.065 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
          
Stock issues 0.047 0.069 0.040 0.074 0.090 0.122 0.131 0.221 
p-value 0.017 0.030 0.026 0.013 0.003 0.019 0.008 0.013 
          
Debt issues   0.070 0.097   0.289 0.318 
p-value   0.027 0.032   0.000 0.003 
          
ΔCashHoldings -0.033 -0.034 -0.013 -0.026 -0.132 -0.149 -0.104 -0.171 
p-value 0.248 0.490 0.643 0.509 0.003 0.017 0.018 0.013 
          
m2 -0.730 -2.450 -1.62 -2.64 2.39 0.13 0.16 0.62 
Hansen J-test 0.327 0.803 0.361 0.797 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.364 
Diff-Hansen 0.032 0.410 0.042 0.175 0.010 0.000 0.000  
          
Obs 3,922 1,698 3,922 1,698 14535 6274 6274 6274 
Firms 566 566 566 566 2092 2092 2092 2092 
 
 
